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This paper examines the extent of consumption insurance against income risk by 
households in rural India. We estimate the effects of income changes on consumption 
after controlling for aggregate shocks through changes in village level consumption and 
household size. We also test whether there is a systematic wealth effect on the extent of 
consumption insurance against idiosyncratic income shocks by classifying the 
households on the basis of landholding, which is the primary source of wealth for rural 
households in India. The null hypothesis of full insurance is rejected both for the 
population as a whole and for the different land classes. Our estimation results also 
show that consumption tracks income more closely for the poorer households  the 
estimated marginal propensity to consume out of idiosyncratic changes in income is 
significantly higher for the poorer households compared to the richer households. The 
results are robust to alternative estimation methodologies and alternative methods of 
sample stratification.  
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1. Introduction 
The literature on risk and insurance in poor rural economies argues that income risks are 
pervasive in these economies. That leads us to the question of how well (if at all) are 
households in rural economies able to insure consumption against such shocks to 
income? In the recent past this question has led to a large volume of literature that 
examines the success or otherwise of households in insuring consumption and 
identifying the different mechanisms that could potentially be used to enable households 
to insure against the different kinds of income shocks. The literature has concluded that 
indeed households take actions aimed at protecting consumption, by drawing on both 
private and social risk sharing arrangements. Townsend (1994) lists five potential risk-
bearing institutions: (1) Spatial diversification of land holdings, (2) Storage of grains 
from one year to the next, (3) Purchases and sales of assets such as bullocks and land, 
(4) Credit from formal and informal sources and (5) Gifts and Transfers within the 
family networks.1  However it is also agreed that not all households are equally able to 
insure consumption against income shocks and differentiated access to markets, 
particularly financial markets result in differential ability of households to insure against 
income shocks.  
 If risks are idiosyncratic in nature, then households will pool together to share all 
risks. Further if risks are fully pooled then there is complete risk sharing among 
households and changes in household consumption will track changes in the community 
average consumption and nothing else. In particular, changes in factors specific to the 
                                                 
1 See Alderman and Paxson (1992), Deaton (1997), Fafchamps (1992), Grimard (1997), Morduch (1995) 
and Townsend (1994, 1995a) for a review of the theories and empirical evidence using different data sets. 
Morduch (1995) categories the different mechanism into two categories: exante income smoothing and 
expost consumption smoothing.    
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household like changes in household income will not have a statistically significant 
impact on changes in household consumption. In such a case we say that consumption is 
fully insured. As a consequence the estimated marginal propensity to consume out of 
idiosyncratic changes in income should not be statistically different from zero. Consider 
a regression of a change in household consumption on a change in community average 
consumption and a change in household income. If consumption is fully insured then 
the coefficient estimate of community average consumption should be one and the 
coefficient estimate of household income should be zero. The actual amount of risk 
sharing that actually takes place can now be compared to this benchmark of complete 
risk sharing. Note however that the community average consumption, which is a 
measure of aggregate risk (common to all households in the community), will continue 
to fluctuate.  
 In addition to the general question of risk sharing by rural households, this paper 
also examines whether the arrangements for consumption insurance in rural economies 
work better for some households (belonging to specific wealth groups) compared to 
others. On the one hand poorer households are likely to be more risk averse and hence 
they are more likely to undertake specific measures to reduce the variability of their 
income and hence directly reduce the variability of consumption. On the other hand 
poorer households are more likely to be rationed in the availability of credit and 
insurance, so they are less likely to be able to insure consumption once the income 
shock has occurred. Therefore a-priori we cannot say whether poor households are more 
vulnerable or not. Our estimation results show that the poorer households are actually 
more vulnerable.  
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 Different versions of this empirical specification have been tested using 
household level data from both developed and developing countries. Mace (1991) in her 
study on risk sharing in the US economy finds that the evidence is conditional on the 
preference specification. Results are mostly consistent with consumption insurance for 
the exponential utility specification but not for the power utility specification. 
Townsend (1995) finds overwhelming rejection of the null hypothesis for different 
regions in Thailand. He finds that consumption in one ampoe (region or state) tracks 
income in that region. Deaton (1992) obtains a similar conclusion using data from Côte 
dIvoire. He finds that the marginal propensities to consume out of current income are 
always positive and significant. Jalan and Ravallion (1999) using data from rural China 
find that that while full insurance is always rejected, there is evidence of partial 
insurance for certain wealth groups and the rejection of full insurance is the strongest 
for the poorest wealth decile. Results from rural India are somewhat varied. Townsend 
(1994) in his study of risk and insurance in three ICRISAT villages finds that full 
consumption insurance is a fairly good benchmark.2 Maitra (1998) on the other hand 
using data from rural Punjab finds no evidence in favour of consumption insurance 
against idiosyncratic income shocks.  This paper uses a household level panel data set 
from rural India to examine the extent of consumption insurance. India is characterised 
by extreme regional variations in income and as such is a very interesting country to 
examine. This is the first paper that examines consumption insurance using data from all 
parts of India, without focussing on specific regions as the Semi-Arid tropics 
(Townsend, 1994) or rural Punjab (Maitra, 1998).  
                                                 
2 Data collected by the International Crop Research Institute for the Semi Arid Tropics (ICRISAT). This 
data is referred to as the ICRISAT data and the villages included in this survey the ICRISAT villages.  
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The issue of consumption insurance has important policy implications. In many 
developing countries, governments and policy makers have implemented programs (like 
food for work programs, credit schemes, buffer stocks and crop insurance schemes) 
aimed at reducing the riskiness of income and provide insurance for the poor. The basic 
premise is that left to themselves (and in the absence of such government programs) 
poor households will be unable to insure themselves against income shocks. Given that 
these programs are expensive it is important to examine whether this argument is 
correct or not because it is an important issue from the point of view of designing 
efficient policies.  
 The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data set 
used and also presents selected descriptive statistics on the relative volatility of income 
and expenditure and the co-movement of these variables. Section 3 describes the 
theoretical model that motivates the test for insurance that is used in this paper. Section 
4 describes the empirical specification used. Section 5 presents the basic results, Section 
6 the sensitivity of the results to alternative estimation techniques and also to alternative 
methods of sample stratification. Finally Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
This paper tests for insurance against income shocks in rural India. For this purpose we 
use a panel data set from rural India obtained from a survey conducted by the National 
Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) in three rounds for the years 1968-
69, 1969-70 and 1970-71  the Additional Rural Income Survey (ARIS). The data set 
will henceforth be referred to as the ARIS-NCAER data. The main purpose of the 
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survey was to measure the changes in income levels and income distribution and the 
consequent changes in the patterns of consumption, investment and savings of 
households in rural areas. The final data set we use in this paper consists of 4118 
households residing in 257 villages. Detailed information was collected on the 
demographic composition of the household including household size and composition, 
the number of earners in the household, income by source, expenditure on different 
accounts, savings and asset holdings by type. More details about the survey can be 
obtained from NCAER (1975).  
 The measure of consumption that is used in this paper includes expenditure on 
food, non-food items (including toiletry), fuel and lighting, clothing, education, medical 
items, services and entertainment. The measure of income used includes income earned 
from crop profits, livestock, agricultural wages, regular salaries earned and income from 
self-employment. 
 To test for systematic inter-household differences in the extent of consumption 
smoothing, the sample is stratified on the basis of landownership. This method of 
stratification is used because in rural India landholding is the primary indicator of 
wealth because of the collateral value associated with land. This pattern of sample 
stratification is also a good indicator of how credit constrained a household is likely to 
be. The households are grouped into 4 categories depending on the amount of land 
owned: the landless (907 households), the small landowners owning between 1.0 and 
2.5 hectares (1699 households), the medium landowners owning between 2.6 and 6.5 
hectares (980 households) and finally the large landowners owning in excess of 6.5 
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hectares (532 households). We examine the sensitivity of the estimates to alternative 
sample stratification in Section 6.  
Table 1 presents the summary statistics (sample size, mean and standard 
deviation) for income and consumption for each of the three years, for the full sample 
and also for the sample stratified on the basis of landownership. We also present the 
Coefficient of Variation (CV) of both Total Income and Total Consumption 
Expenditure for each of the three years. The Coefficient of Variation is a unit free 
measure of volatility. Notice that income is much more volatile compared to 
consumption, irrespective of the landholding of the household. Also presented are the 
correlation between the change in income and change in consumption expenditure. 
Generally consumption tracks income more closely for the poorer households (i.e., the 
correlation between change in total income and change in total consumption 
expenditure is higher) but the correlation is always statistically significant.  
 The descriptive statistics presented show that while the volatility of consumption 
expenditure is generally less than the volatility of income (indicating some amount of 
consumption smoothing), income and consumption generally co-move, irrespective of 
the wealth group. However to test whether there is sharing of idiosyncratic risk within a 
village, we need to control for aggregate village level shock. We do that next.  
  
3. Conditions for Risk Sharing – Theory 
Let us assume that income risk is the only form of risk faced by a particular community. 
Complete risk sharing in this framework will result in each household in the community 
being protected from idiosyncratic risk. Consumption will still vary but that is only 
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because of the risk common to all households (aggregate community level risk). The 
test for full insurance is therefore a test of the validity of Pareto Optimality for the 
economy under consideration.3 The problem for the social planner is to  
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where πs is the probability of state S , 1,  s s, …= ; cits is household consumption and yits is 
household income; µis is the time invariant Pareto Weight associated with household 
I,1,ii, K=  in state s and I is the number of households; ρ is the rate of time preference 
assumed to be the same for all households, θits incorporates factors that change tastes. 
The Langrangian associated with this problem is: 
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Different specifications of the utility function ( )( )itsits θ;cU  will give different empirical 
specifications. Let us consider an exponential utility function with the specific 
functional form for U given by 
( ) ( ){ }itsitsitsits θ-cαexpα
1θ;cU −−=    (4) 
Using this specific functional form for U, the first order conditions (after manipulations 
and disregarding the notation for the state) can be written as 
                                                 
3 The test described below closely follows Mace (1991). Cochrane (1991) and Townsend (1994) present 
similar tests. 
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Under the assumption of full consumption insurance, change in individual consumption 
∆cit depends only on change in aggregate consumption at∆c .  
 On the other hand if the specific form of the utility function is  
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the first order conditions (again after manipulations and disregarding the notation for the 
state) can be written as: 
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Once again however under the assumption of full insurance, change in household 
consumption depends only on change in community average consumption.  
 To examine how Pareto Optimal allocation is attained in a decentralised 
economy, we assume the existence of a complete set of Arrow Debreu securities. The 
existence of such securities allows me to decentralise the economy and examine 
whether full insurance can be attained through market mechanisms in such an economy. 
This enables us to test for consumption insurance for subsets of the population. In 
particular we test for consumption insurance for households classified by land holding. 
It can easily be shown that if there exists a complete set of Arrow Debreu securities, 
then the equilibrium consumption allocation will be identical to that obtained under a 
social planners problem.  
 Let us now turn to the empirical specification. 
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4. Empirical Framework 
Let wivtc  denote the per capita consumption of household i in village v in year t and 
belonging to the wealth group w ( )W,1,wT;,0,tV;,1,vI;,1,i KKKK ==== . 
Under the assumption of complete risk pooling (full insurance), the change in household 
consumption from year t to year 1t +  depends only on the corresponding change in the 
aggregate village level consumption. The empirical specification follows immediately. 
Regress the change in the consumption of the ith household on the change in the village 
level average consumption and other explanatory variables like the change in household 
consumption. All variables with the exception of changes in average village level 
consumption are predicted to enter insignificantly. If the utility function is given by (4), 
we can write the empirical specification as 
w
ivt
w
ivt
w
3
w
ivt
w
2
aw
vt
w
1
w
0
w
ivt ε∆nβ∆yβ∆cββ∆c ++++=   (8) 
Here wivt∆y  is the change in household is per capita income and 
w
ivt∆n  is the change in 
the household size. The error term wivtε  includes both preference shocks ( )itθ  and 
measurement error and is distributed identically and independently. The null hypothesis 
of full risk sharing predicts that 0β,1β w2
w
1 == .  
If on the other hand the utility function is given by (5), the empirical 
specification can be written as 
( ) ( ) ( ) wivtwivtw3wivtw2*awvtw1w0wivt εn∆logβy∆logβ∆cββc∆log ++++=  (9) 
Once again the null hypothesis of full risk sharing predicts that 0β,1β w2
w
1 == .  
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5. Results 
Table 2 presents the coefficient estimates for the regression of the change in the level of 
consumption on the change in the level of income and the change in the community 
average level of consumption (estimates of equation (7)). In this and in all subsequent 
regressions we control for the change in household size. The coefficient of the change in 
household size ( )w3β  is always negative and statistically significant. Results are 
presented for all households (full sample) and the sample stratified on the basis of 
landholding. The joint test presented in the Table refers to the test for full insurance 
0β1,β w2
w
1 == . Note that 
w
2β  is the estimated marginal propensity to consume out of 
total income. Two alternative specifications are considered. In the first we consider 
household income to be exogenous. The estimates are computed using OLS. We then 
account for the possibility that household income might actually be endogenous in that 
households might be using some component of income for the purposes of consumption 
smoothing  for example one response to crop failure might be to look for additional 
non-farm work. Lagged levels of income, savings and the number of earners in the 
household are used as instruments to compute the instrumental variable (IV) estimates.  
The following results are worth noting. First, the estimated marginal propensities 
to consume are generally the higher when income is assumed to be exogenous (OLS 
estimates) compared to the case where income is assumed to be endogenous (IV 
estimates). Second the estimated marginal propensities to consume are always 
significantly greater than zero and this is true for all households and separately for 
households belonging to the different land classes. Third, the null hypothesis of full 
insurance (that changes in household consumption is related to changes in community 
 
 
 
 
 
Consumption Insurance in Rural India   
 
12 
level average consumption and not to changes in household income) is always rejected. 
Fourth, the estimated marginal propensities to consume out of idiosyncratic changes in 
income are higher for the landless households and the small landowners compared to 
the medium and large landowners. These results therefore imply that the poorest 
households are the most vulnerable to idiosyncratic income shocks as consumption 
generally tracks income more closely for the poorer households (landless households 
and small landowners).  
Table 3 presents the estimated coefficients corresponding to equation (9)  
growth rates in consumption regressed on growth rates of income and growth rates in 
community average consumption. Here the estimated coefficients of w2β  may be 
interpreted as the elasticity of consumption with respect to change in income. Once 
again two sets of estimates are presented. The results are similar to those presented in 
Table 2. As before the OLS estimates are higher compared to the IV estimates, and once 
again irrespective of the estimation methodology used, the null hypothesis of full 
insurance is always rejected. We again find that the poorest households are the most 
vulnerable to income shocks as consumption generally tracks income more closely for 
the poorer households.  
India is characterised by significant regional variations  certain parts of the 
country are poorer than others and therefore it is likely that institutions vary 
significantly across these very different regions. To examine whether there are any 
regional variations in the extent of consumption insurance we stratify households on the 
basis of the region of residence: East (comprising of the states of Assam, Bihar, Orissa 
and West Bengal), West (comprising of the states of Gujarat, Maharashtra and 
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Rajastan), North (comprising of the states of Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and 
Kashmir, Haryana, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh) and South (comprising of the states of 
Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu). The results are presented in 
Tables 4. Note that we only present the coefficient estimates for the linear version and 
the coefficient estimates for the log-linear version are not presented but are available on 
request. The following results are worth noting. First, the OLS estimates of the 
estimated marginal propensities to consume out of idiosyncratic changes in income are 
almost always higher compared to the corresponding IV estimates. This implies that 
endogenising income consistently reduces the estimated marginal propensities to 
consume out of changes in income. Third, in general consumption tracks income more 
closely for the poorer households (the landless and the small landowners) compared to 
the richer households (the medium and large landowners). For example, the OLS 
estimates show that the estimated marginal propensity to consume out of income is as 
high as 0.596 for the landless households residing in the East compared to 0.071 for the 
large landowners in the same region. Fourth, the null hypothesis of full insurance 
( )0β1,β w2w1 ==  is generally rejected. They are always rejected for the poorer 
households and in the few cases where consumption is insured against idiosyncratic 
income shocks (i.e., household consumption changes in response to changes in the 
community average consumption and not in response to changes in household income), 
the households belong to the medium or large landowning category.  
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6. Robustness 
How sensitive are our results to the estimation methodology used and the sample 
stratification used. We consider several tests to ensure that the results are robust to 
alternative estimation methodologies used and alternative sample stratification used.  
 Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997) and Jalan and Ravallion (1999) criticise the 
estimation methodology used above arguing that this test gives biases estimates of the 
excess sensitivity parameter against the alternative of risk-market failure whenever there 
is a common village level component in household level income changes. They instead 
use the following specification: 
    wivt
w
ivt
w
3
w
ivt
w
2
jk
jk
ivt
w
1jk
w
ivt ε∆nβ∆yβDβ∆c +++= ∑    (10) 
where jkivtD  is a village-time dummy variable such that  
     
 ==
=
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tk and vj if 1,
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The rest of the variables are the same as in equation (8). Notice that we again control for 
changes in household size. In this specification aggregate income risk is captured by the 
interacted village-time dummies and idiosyncratic income risk is captured by changes in 
income, which may be endogenous. If there is perfect income insurance within the 
village, then changes in household income will have no effect on consumption, after 
controlling for the village-time effects, i.e., 0βw2 = . We also consider a restricted 
version of equation (10) where we do not control for the village-time effects 
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Once again if consumption is fully insured against both idiosyncratic and covariate 
shocks, then 0β*w2 = . 
 The estimated coefficients are presented in Table 5. Once again two alternative 
versions of equation (10) and (11) are estimated: in the first income is assumed to be 
exogenous and in the second, income is assumed to be endogenous, with lagged 
savings, lagged income and lagged number of earners used as instruments. We also 
estimated log-linear versions of these two equations and the results are available on 
request. The results are similar to those obtained earlier. The estimated marginal 
propensities to consume out of idiosyncratic changes in income is always rejected and 
consumption tracks income closely for the poorer households. It might be noted that the 
estimated marginal propensities are generally lower compared to those presented in 
Table 2.  
 The second specification test that we consider is yet another test of the 
sensitivity of the results to the estimation methodology used. The estimation 
methodology used thus far did not take into account the panel structure of the data. We 
next re-estimate equation (8) taking into account the panel structure of the data by 
including household level fixed effects that corrects for the potential omitted variable 
bias caused by the unobserved household fixed effects. To account for the potential 
endogeneity of income, we also consider the fixed effects IV regression. The results are 
presented in Table 6. The results are quite similar to those presented in Table 2. To re-
iterate, once again the null hypothesis of full insurance ( )0β1,β w2w1 ==  is always 
rejected and we again find that consumption tracks income more closely in the poorer 
households. The estimated marginal propensities to consume out of idiosyncratic 
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income changes are always significantly greater than zero. Also notice that the 
estimated coefficients for w2β  are lower when income is assumed to be endogenous.  
 In our estimation thus far, we have stratified the sample on the basis of 
landownership arguing that in rural India landownership is the primary indicator of 
wealth because of the collateral value associated with land. How sensitive are the 
estimates to this particular form of stratification used? We next consider an alternative 
method of stratification using the highest level of education attained by any member of 
the household. Households are stratified into one of the following four categories: No 
education (EDUC = 1), the most educated member of the household has some primary 
schooling or is literate without any formal education (EDUC = 2), the most educated 
member of the household has more than primary but less than matriculation (EDUC = 
3) and the most educated member of the household has more than high school education 
(EDUC = 4). Total household income increases with the educational attainment of the 
most educated member of the household.4 Once again two sets of estimates are 
presented  OLS estimates when income is exogenous and the IV estimates when 
income is assumed to be endogenous. The estimated coefficients are presented in Table 
7. Once again the null hypothesis of full insurance ( )0β1,β w2w1 ==  is rejected. Further 
the null hypothesis that the estimated marginal propensities to consume out of income 
are zero ( )0βw2 =  are also rejected. Consumption tracks income for the poorer 
households when income is assumed to be exogenous. The results are somewhat 
different when income is assumed to be endogenous  in particular we find that when 
                                                 
4 For example, the average household income in 1970-71 for the households in each of the four categories 
were as follows: Rs 2375.38, Rs 3373.45, Rs 5096.95 and Rs 6898.66.   
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income is assumed to be endogenous, the estimated marginal propensity to consume is 
the lowest for the poorest households (no member of the household has any education  
EDUC = 0).  
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper examines the extent of consumption insurance against income risk by 
households in rural India. Motivated by the theory of risk sharing we estimate the 
effects of income changes on consumption after controlling for aggregate shocks 
through changes in village level consumption and household size. We also test whether 
there is a systematic wealth effect on the extent of consumption insurance against 
idiosyncratic income shocks by classifying the households on the basis of landholding, 
which is the primary source of wealth for rural households in India. 
Consumption regressions using the ARIS-NCAER data show that the null 
hypothesis of full insurance is rejected both for the population as a whole and for the 
different land classes. Our estimation results also show that consumption tracks income 
more closely for the poorer households  the estimated marginal propensity to consume 
out of idiosyncratic changes in income is significantly higher for the poorer households 
compared to the richer households. The results are robust to alternative estimation 
methodologies and alternative methods of sample stratification.  
The implications of the results are quite significant. Governments and non-
governmental organisations have implemented various programs designed specifically 
to reduce the riskiness of rural incomes and the stated aim of such programs is often to 
provide a safety net to the rural poor. It appears however that the programs are not being 
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targeted adequately  the poorest continue to be the most vulnerable. The results in this 
paper strengthen the case for improved public insurance programs, targeted at the most 
vulnerable, in underdeveloped rural economies. What specific form the program should 
take is left open to debate.  
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Table 1: 
Selected Descriptive Statistics 
  1968 – 69  1969 – 70  1970 – 71  
 Sample 
Size 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
All Households        
Total Income 4118 3840.516 4239.807 3975.463 3762.848 4208.211 4095.707 
Total Expenditure 4118 3002.369 2576.365 3118.308 2418.402 3186.873 2458.127 
CV (Total Income)  110.397 94.6518 97.3266 
CV (Total Expenditure)  85.8111 77.5549 77.1329 
Correlation*    0.3883 
(0.0000) 
0.5149 
(0.0000) 
Landless Households        
Total Income 907 2178.840 2421.497 2116.427 1802.195 2256.591 2404.215 
Total Expenditure 907 1851.308 1917.734 1922.929 1451.966 1954.802 1607.362 
CV (Total Income)  111.137 85.1527 106.542 
CV (Total Expenditure)  103.588 75.508 82.2263 
Correlation*    0.6035 
(0.0000) 
0.5271 
(0.0000) 
Small Landowners        
Total Income 1699 2895.491 2565.156 2920.519 2236.783 2990.534 2195.875 
Total Expenditure 1699 2453.692 1865.769 2521.446 1697.379 2564.243 1637.806 
CV (Total Income)   88.5914  76.5885  73.4275 
CV (Total Expenditure)   76.0393  67.3177  63.8709 
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Correlation*    0.4765 
(0.0000) 
0.6711 
(0.0000) 
Medium Landowners        
Total Income 980 4986.281 4244.981 5212.728 3382.835 5468.707 3507.855 
Total Expenditure 980 3865.374 2719.264 3999.813 2409.040 4079.836 2347.032 
CV (Total Income)  85.1332 64.8957 64.1441 
CV (Total Expenditure)  70.3493 60.2288 57.5276 
Correlation*    0.3858 
(0.0000) 
0.4978 
(0.0000) 
Large Landowners        
Total Income 532 7580.904 7147.765 8234.820 6055.951 9102.318 6626.628 
Total Expenditure 532 5127.310 3361.450 5438.615 3380.523 5630.923 3523.768 
CV (Total Income)  94.2864 73.5408 72.8015 
CV (Total Expenditure)  65.5597 62.1578 62.5789 
Correlation*    0.3143 
(0.0000) 
0.4734 
(0.0000) 
Notes: 
CV = (SD/Mean)*100 
*: Correlation between change in Total Income and change in Total Expenditure  
Figures in Parenthesis indicate p-values 
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Table 2:  
Consumption Changes Regressed on Income Changes (Levels) 
 Income Exogenous Income Endogenous 
 aw
vt∆c  
w
ivt∆y  Joint 
Testa 
aw
vt∆c  
w
ivt∆y  Joint 
Testa 
All 
Households 
0.860*** 
(0.016) 
0.179*** 
(0.006) 
477.34*** 0.876*** 
(0.017) 
0.162*** 
(0.012) 
50.68*** 
Landless 
Households 
0.850*** 
(0.039) 
0.322*** 
(0.021) 
115.53*** 0.853*** 
(0.041) 
0.315*** 
(0.033) 
46.84*** 
Small 
Landowners 
0.767*** 
(0.028) 
0.311*** 
(0.010) 
461.81*** 0.861*** 
(0.033) 
0.167*** 
(0.027) 
19.08*** 
Medium 
Landowners 
0.880*** 
(0.029) 
0.119*** 
(0.009) 
83.35*** 0.892*** 
(0.031) 
0.104*** 
(0.015) 
25.46*** 
Large 
Landowners 
0.898*** 
(0.036) 
0.126*** 
(0.013) 
51.19*** 0.904*** 
(0.040) 
0.118*** 
(0.029) 
8.17*** 
Notes: 
Figures in Parenthesis are Standard Errors 
***: Significant at 1% 
Joint Testa: F~0β,1β w2
w
1 ==  
 
Table 3:  
Consumption Changes Regressed on Income Changes (Growth Rates) 
 Income Exogenous Income Endogenous 
 *aw
vt∆c  ( )wivty∆log  Joint 
Testa 
*aw
vt∆c  ( )wivty∆log  Joint 
Testa 
All 
Households 
0.805*** 
(0.013) 
0.247*** 
(0.006) 
891.60*** 0.842*** 
(0.014) 
0.188*** 
(0.010) 
182.27*** 
Landless 
Households 
0.722*** 
(0.027) 
0.391*** 
(0.014) 
410.49*** 0.794*** 
(0.030) 
0.276*** 
(0.023) 
75.72*** 
Small 
Landowners 
0.791*** 
(0.022) 
0.278*** 
(0.010) 
405.92*** 0.844*** 
(0.023) 
0.172*** 
(0.016) 
64.27*** 
Medium 
Landowners 
0.868*** 
(0.023) 
0.157*** 
(0.011) 
105.43*** 0.896*** 
(0.025) 
0.115*** 
(0.018) 
20.70*** 
Large 
Landowners 
0.842*** 
(0.034) 
0.188*** 
(0.014) 
89.40*** 0.845*** 
(0.036) 
0.184*** 
(0.020) 
40.28*** 
Notes: 
Figures in Parenthesis are Standard Errors 
***: Significant at 1% 
Joint Testa: F~0β,1β w2
w
1 ==  
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Table 4:  
Consumption Changes Regressed on Income Changes, by Region (Levels) 
 Income Exogenous Income Endogenous 
 ( )wivty∆log  Joint Testa ( )wivty∆log  Joint Testa 
All 
Households 
    
East 0.258*** 
(0.014) 
177.21*** 0.163*** 
(0.030) 
16.04*** 
West 0.213*** 
(0.017) 
82.72*** 0.211*** 
(0.032) 
22.24*** 
North 0.177*** 
(0.009) 
176.99*** 0.163*** 
(0.024) 
23.63*** 
South 0.140*** 
(0.009) 
127.77*** 0.122*** 
(0.016) 
29.91*** 
Landless 
Households 
    
East 0.596*** 
(0.030) 
192.28*** 0.264*** 
(0.082) 
5.99*** 
West 0.418*** 
(0.060) 
24.15*** 0.499*** 
(0.079) 
19.86*** 
North 0.259*** 
(0.028) 
42.31*** 0.194*** 
(0.050) 
7.71*** 
South 0.175*** 
(0.015) 
65.98*** 0.143*** 
(0.024) 
19.18*** 
Small 
Landowners 
    
East 0.352*** 
(0.024) 
110.84*** 0.268*** 
(0.046) 
17.32*** 
West 0.228*** 
(0.024) 
46.39*** 0.133*** 
(0.046) 
4.50** 
North 0.303*** 
(0.016) 
189.43*** 0.125*** 
(0.039) 
5.40*** 
South 0.349*** 
(0.023) 
115.22*** 0.162*** 
(0.079) 
2.19 
Medium 
Landowners 
    
East 0.216*** 
(0.027) 
31.58*** 0.117 
(0.075) 
1.43 
West 0.202*** 
(0.019) 
55.53*** 0.173*** 
(0.034) 
13.14*** 
North 0.112*** 
(0.021) 
14.76*** 0.085** 
(0.037) 
2.60* 
South 0.091*** 
(0.014) 
20.75*** 0.084*** 
(0.084) 
9.97*** 
Large     
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Landowners 
East 0.071*** 
(0.027) 
3.61** 0.113*** 
(0.036) 
5.00*** 
West 0.103*** 
(0.021) 
12.58*** 0.021 
(0.043) 
0.22 
North 0.150*** 
(0.020) 
29.02*** 0.168*** 
(0.047) 
6.40*** 
South 0.199*** 
(0.036) 
5.50*** 0.166* 
(0.084) 
1.94 
Notes: 
Figures in Parenthesis are Standard Errors 
***: Significant at 1% 
**: Significant at 5% 
*: Significant at 10% 
Joint Testa: F~0β,1β w2
w
1 ==  
Regressions Control for Community Average Consumption 
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Table 5: 
Consumption Changes Regressed on Income Changes with and without Village 
Level Dummies 
 
 Income Exogenous Income Endogenous 
 Including 
Village Level 
Dummies 
Without 
Village Level 
Dummies 
Including 
Village Level 
Dummies 
Without 
Village Level 
Dummies 
All Households 0.258*** 
(0.007) 
0.254*** 
(0.007) 
0.235*** 
(0.014) 
0.238*** 
(0.014) 
Landless 
Households 
0.366*** 
(0.026) 
0.425*** 
(0.023) 
0.364*** 
(0.036) 
0.451*** 
(0.035) 
Small 
Landowners 
0.388*** 
(0.012) 
0.380*** 
(0.011) 
0.178*** 
(0.031) 
0.228*** 
(0.029) 
Medium 
Landowners 
0.183*** 
(0.013) 
0.190*** 
(0.011) 
0.166*** 
(0.019) 
0.162*** 
(0.017) 
Large 
Landowners 
0.207*** 
(0.018) 
0.196*** 
(0.015) 
0.237*** 
(0.042) 
0.166*** 
(0.036) 
Notes: 
Figures in Parenthesis are Standard Errors 
***: Significant at 1% 
 
Table 6: 
Consumption Changes Regressed on Income Changes (Levels) – Fixed Effects 
 Income Exogenous Income Endogenous 
 aw
vt∆c  
w
ivt∆y  Joint 
Testa 
aw
vt∆c  
w
ivt∆y  Joint 
Testb 
All 
Households 
0.870*** 
(0.024) 
0.177*** 
(0.009) 
200.78*** 0.894*** 
(0.024) 
0.139*** 
(0.010) 
181.82*** 
Landless 
Households 
0.866*** 
(0.057) 
0.319*** 
(0.034) 
44.20*** 0.886*** 
(0.058) 
0.267*** 
(0.038) 
50.46*** 
Small 
Landowners 
0.771*** 
(0.043) 
0.309*** 
(0.015) 
218.48*** 0.812*** 
(0.044) 
0.244*** 
(0.018) 
193.03*** 
Medium 
Landowners 
0.908*** 
(0.040) 
0.099*** 
(0.013) 
27.61*** 0.933*** 
(0.041) 
0.066*** 
(0.015) 
18.52*** 
Large 
Landowners 
0.8653*** 
(0.055) 
0.137*** 
(0.019) 
27.50*** 0.865*** 
(0.055) 
0.137*** 
(0.022) 
39.40*** 
Notes: 
Figures in Parenthesis are Standard Errors 
***: Significant at 1% 
*: Significant at 10% 
#: Number of Groups = 4118 
Joint Testa: F~0β,1β w2
w
1 ==  
Joint Testb: 2w2
w
1 χ~0β,1β ==  
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Table 7: 
Consumption Changes Regressed on Income Changes (Levels) – Stratified by the 
Highest Level of Education Attained by any Member of the Household 
 Income Exogenous Income Endogenous 
 w
ivt∆y  Joint Test
a w
ivt∆y  Joint Test
a 
All Households 0.169*** 
(0.005) 
575.60*** 0.141*** 
(0.010) 
90.92*** 
Illiterate 0.208*** 
(0.009) 
261.07*** 0.078*** 
(0.023) 
5.69*** 
Some Primary 
Schooling 
0.188*** 
(0.009) 
201.73*** 0.118*** 
(0.026) 
11.09*** 
Middle 
Schooling 
0.189*** 
(0.011) 
145.78*** 0.182*** 
 (0.024) 
29.35*** 
Post Secondary 0.132*** 
(0.011) 
75.19*** 0.145*** 
(0.018) 
33.07*** 
Notes: 
Figures in Parenthesis are Standard Errors 
***: Significant at 1% 
*: Significant at 10% 
Joint Testa: F~0β,1β w2
w
1 ==  
Regressions Control for Community Average Consumption 
 
